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DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV

VOL. 60

RECENT CASE
TORTS-INSURANCE COVERAGE-EFFECT ON CONTRIBUTION
In the case of Puller v. Puller' a problem of importance arose involving the
interpretation of an automobile insurance exclusion clause and what effect this2
interpretation would have on the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
The facts of the case are as follows. An automobile owned and operated by
the joint tortfeasor, Puller, in which his wife and minor daughter were passengers,
collided with a locomotive. All three were injured and brought an action against
the railroad company. The latter obtained a severance of Puller's claim and joined
him as an additional defendant. The jury found both parties liable. The railroad
company paid the verdicts in full and had the judgment marked to its use against
Puller. The railroad company as use plaintiff issued attachment executions against
Puller, naming his insurer as garnishee. The garnishee defended on the ground
that the construction of a provision in Puller's policy did not allow recovery. The
provision of the policy follows:
"This policy does not apply . . . (d) under Coverage A, to bodily injury to or death of any employee of the insured . . . or to the in-

sured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured.
"Coverage A-Bodily Injury Liability. To pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by rea-

son of the liability imposed upon him by law for damages . . . because
of bodily injury . . . sustained by any person or persons, caused by ac-

cident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
automobile."
The lower court held in favor of the garnishee, and this was affirmed by
the supreme court on appeal.
The court followed the well-settled rule which allows a tortfeasor contribution from a joint tortfeasor where the plaintiff is excluded from bringing an
action directly against the joint tortfeasor. This rule4 was set out in Fisher v.
Diehi' and became a settled part of Pennsylvania law.
The court used the theory of equitable contribution which is stated in Feldman v. Gomes:5
"As between the two defendants, the contribution is not a matter
of recovery for a tort. It is a liability arising from an implied engagement
to jointly contribute for the wrong done. It is a mere debt arising from
an equitable duty, having none of the6 elements of a tort."
As stated in Freeman v. Sundheim, this theory is now firmly embedded in
Pennsylvania law.
1 380 Pa. 219, 110 A. 2d 175 (1955).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2081-2089 (Purdon 1955).

8 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A. 2d 912 (1944).
4 Maio, Executrix v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A. 2d 105 (1940); Rau v. Manko, 341 Pa. 17, 17
A. 2d 422 (1941).

5 98 Pa. Super. 84 (1929) ; see also: 13 C. J. 825; 54 DicK L. REv. 198 (1949).
6 348 Pa. 248, 35 A. 2d 295 (1944).
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The problem then became one of giving effect to the apparently unambiguous provisions of the insurance coverage in the light of the adoption of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the theory of equitable contribution.
The court adhered to the principle that the insurance coverage should be
resolved in favor of the insurer where the language is dear and unambiguous. 7
Then the court found ground for its interpretation by saying, "The well known
reason for the exclusion clause of the policy is that it is intended as a protection
against collusive claims".
It is to be noted that the interpretation of the court excludes a tortfeasor
from contribution by way of an insurer who may well be the only means of such
contribution and who exists for just such a purpose in our dynamic, auto-minded
society. This denial viewed in the light of the court's statement quoted above
that the exclusion clause exists for protection against collusive claims seems to
be precluding the use of the doctrine of equitable contribution which has been
carefully established by the courts and set out in this case by allowing a wife
to collect indirectly from her spouse. The conclusion of the court is logical inso-far as it is so interpreted, but to deny contribution to a non-collusive tortfeasor
is to halt in the middle of the problem.
In the commissioners' prefatory note to the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act,8 some of the language bears mention:
"The desire for equal or proportionate distribution of a common
burden among those upon whom it rests is everywhere fundamental."
Also:
"As an original proposition, all might agree that courts should not
lend their aid to rascals, in adjusting differences among them. But all
tortfeasors are not rascals, in spite of the literal translation of the terms
as wrongdoers. Most joint and several tort liability results from inadvertently caused damage, although it is almost impossible to draw a
practical line between torts of inadvertence and others."
This typifies the basis and reasoning of the act as set out by the Commissioners,9 and this reasoning must be attributed to the passage of the act by the
Pennsylvania Legislature in 1951.

Therefore, it now seems that regardless of the established doctrine of equitable contribution in Pennsylvania law and the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, we are placed in the anomalous position of at

least a partial return to the old doctrine of no contribution among tortfeasors
by permitting the use of a technical device in the form of a contract.
ALBERT C. HAND
7 Yoder v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 171 Pa. Super 18, 90 A. 2d 399 (1952);
Levinton v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Company, 267 Pa. 448, 110 At. 295 (1920).
8 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 153, 154.

9 Note: The Uniform Contribution Among Tortieasors Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1939.

